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Abstract
In a recent paper, Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study com-
munication games of common interest when signals are simple and
types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so–called
Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set
and Bayesian estimators on the side of receivers. In this note, we in-
troduce conflicts of interest in the same setting. We characterize strict
Nash equilibria as distorted Voronoi languages that use all messages.
For large conflicts, such informative equilibria need not exist. If the
bias is sufficiently small, however, these equilibria do exist. This es-
tablishes the robustness of the results in Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel
(2011) to biased interests. We finally give examples of strict Nash
equilibria, one of them using simulations to illustrate an equilibrium
with many messages and non-uniformly distributed types.
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1 Introduction
In all kinds of situations of everyday life we rely on the decisions of others
and use communication to enforce our interests. If interests are common, the
sender tries to communicate her information as exact as possible. Issues like
this have been widely discussed.1 Recently, Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011)
study a model where the complexity of the information to be communicated is
much higher than the number of messages or signals available to the sender.2
In such a situation, one cannot have perfect separation by design. However,
the authors show that strict Nash equilibria are as separating as possible,
in a sense. The sender separates the type set into (usually convex) cells, a
Voronoi tesselation, and the receiver interprets the signal corresponding to
that cell as the best Bayesian estimator given that the type lies in that cell.
One might wonder whether such equilibria can survive if the interests of
sender and receiver are not perfectly aligned. For economic applications, this
is quite relevant as in many situations we are confronted with different inter-
ests, see the classic discussion in Crawford and Sobel (1982). We add some
own points here. The conflict might be viewed as only a small difference
between friends deciding about the restaurant to go to or as a rather huge
difference between competing firms agreeing on some technical standard. To
give some intuition for the behavior in such situations we consider the fol-
lowing example: A politician, acting as the sender, wants to win an election
and therefore she needs to convince the electorate that her electoral platform
is the one to vote for. Imagine that her party wants to take measures that
are not popular, for example a raise of income or gasoline taxes. The elec-
torate usually wants to get a clear prospect of what the parties want to do
in case they win the election and thus there is a conflict of interest. In order
to win the election, the politician might not communicate the information
about the measures or certain circumstances associated with them as exact
as possible, instead she might communicate a somehow different information
that she thinks is advantageous for her.
Apart from that we can also interpret a small conflict of interest as a bias
1The seminal paper on cheap talk games as we study them here is Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Robson (1990), Matsui (1991), Schlag (1993), Sobel (1993), Blume, Kim, and
Sobel (1993), Wa¨rneryd (1993), Rubinstein (2000), or Trapa and Nowak (2000) are other
prominent examples.
2Blume and Board (2010) extend the model to allow for different degrees of language
competence assuming that the knowledge of messages is private information.
Voronoi Languages 2
due to small mistakes or slightly wrong perceptions of the players.
In this note, we allow biased interests in the model of Ja¨ger, Metzger,
and Riedel (2011). We study a cheap-talk game - or more general a signaling
game - where the set of possible private information of the sender (called
types) is infinite and in particular, high-dimensional, whereas the number
of signals or messages - we usually refer to them as words - is only finite
and, furthermore, interests are biased. This means that the sender has to
aggregate many types under one word, i.e. perfect separation is not possible.
After sending a word, the receiver then needs to interpret it, that is she needs
to choose a prototype for the word. For example consider different weather
conditions, there are literally infinite different rain intensities, but if we talk
about such conditions, we usually only use very few terms like ”light rain”
or ”shower”. The interpretation then can be seen as the typical ”light rain”
or ”shower”. We call an assignment of the types to words for the sender
together with interpretations of the words for the receiver a language.
In our setup, the sender has a certain bias m 6= 0 (a bias on the receiver’s
side can be reduced to this case as well by a shift of the type space). One
might guess that conflicts of interests change the game quite a bit. Indeed,
in Crawford and Sobel (1982), the bias changes the type of equilibria dra-
matically as we go from perfectly separating equilibria to partial information
disclosure only, to give an example. In our case, the strict Nash equilibria
remain qualitatively close to the Voronoi languages of Ja¨ger, Metzger, and
Riedel (2011). Indeed, we characterize strict Nash equilibria as distorted
Voronoi languages that use all messages. In such a language, the sender uses
her distortion shift m to determine the best signal to send. The receiver still
uses a best Bayesian estimator.
For large conflicts, such informative equilibria need not exist as we show
by example. This is plausible: large biases kill the incentives to align inter-
ests and thus preclude informative equilibria. If the bias is sufficiently small,
however, these equilibria do exist. This establishes the robustness of the
results in Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) to biased interests. Therefore,
our result suggests that small conflicts cannot harm communication much.
We finally give examples of strict Nash equilibria, one of them using simu-
lations to illustrate an equilibrium with many messages and non-uniformly
distributed types.
The paper is set up as follows. We introduce our model and notation
first. In section 3 we study the behavior in equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Model and Notation
Let T , the type set, be a convex and compact subset of RL with nonempty
interior for some L ≥ 1. The probability of types is described by an atomless
distribution F on T with strictly positive and continuous density f : T →
R+. The sender chooses a word (signal) w ∈ W := {w1, . . . , wN} from a
finite vocabulary and sends it to the receiver. A sender’s strategy is thus a
measurable function w : T → W . The receiver interprets the word wj as
some point ij ∈ RL. Note that we allow interpretations to lie outside the
type space here. With conflicting interests, we do not want to restrict the
receiver’s choices.
In contrast to Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) we do not assume that
both players have common interests. Instead, we model the conflict of interest
by a vector m 6= 0 in RL, the sender’s bias. Let l : R+ → R be continuous,
convex and strictly increasing, and ‖ · ‖ be a norm on T . The expected loss
or payoff of the sender (S) and the receiver (R), respectively, is then
LS(w, i) :=
∫
T
l
(∥∥t+m− iw(t)∥∥)F (dt)
and
LR(w, i) :=
∫
T
l
(∥∥t− iw(t)∥∥)F (dt).
One might ask why we model a bias on the sender’s side only. Indeed,
this comes without loss of generality. By a suitable translation of the type
space, one can reduce the game with a receiver’s bias (and also the game
with biases on both sides) to the above situation, see the appendix.
3 Distorted Voronoi Languages
Recall from Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) that a language (w, i) consists
of a measurable mapping w : T → W (the signaling strategy) and points
i ∈ (RL)N (the interpretation). A language (w, i) has full vocabulary if
rangew = W . A particular role in our context play Bayesian estimates of
the type given that we are in a specific subset of the type set. For a subset
C ⊆ T with positive measure, we call b(C) = argmini∈T
∫
C
l (‖t− i‖)F (dt)
the Bayesian estimator conditional on C. We know from Ja¨ger, Metzger, and
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Riedel (2011) that this estimator is unique. For quadratic loss and Euclidean
norm, the Bayesian estimator is the conditional mean type.
Ja¨ger, Metzger and Riedel show that strict Nash equilibria are given by
Voronoi languages with full vocabulary: a Voronoi language (w, i) consists of
a Voronoi tesselation for the sender and a Bayesian estimator interpretation
for the receiver3, i.e. we have both
w∗(t) = argminj=1,...,N ‖t− i∗j‖ F − a.s.(1)
ik = b(C
∗
k) ( for C
∗
k = {t ∈ T : w∗(t) = wk}) .(2)
Note that the two players work nicely together in such an equilibrium. They
try to coordinate their actions to produce an equilibrium that is as separating
as possible. With conflict of interests, it is not clear that such a result would
be attainable, at least to the second of these authors. We show now that the
characterization of strict Nash equilibria generalizes indeed to our case of a
biased sender.
Suppose that the receiver uses pairwise distinct interpretations i1, . . . , iN .
Then for a sender of type t, it is optimal to use the signal wj that leads to a
minimal distorted distance, i.e. she chooses wj such that
‖t+m− ij‖ = min
k=1,...,N
‖t+m− ik‖ .4
Let us call the induced partition an m–distorted Voronoi tesselation. Note
that an m–distorted Voronoi tesselation corresponds to the Voronoi tessela-
tion generated by the translated interpretations ιk = ik −m, k = 1, . . . , N .
In turn, if the sender uses such an m–distorted Voronoi tesselation, and
as the receiver is unbiased, her best interpretation is the Bayesian estimator.
Definition 1 An m–distorted Voronoi language (w, i) consists of an m–
distorted Voronoi tessellation for the sender and a Bayesian estimator in-
terpretation for the receiver. i.e. we have both
w∗(t) = argminj=1,...,N ‖t+m− i∗j‖ F − a.s.(3)
ik = b(C
∗
k) ( for C
∗
k = {t ∈ T : w∗(t) = wk}) .(4)
3Note that the cells of a Voronoi tesselation are (up to a null set) convex when we use
the Euclidean norm, see Okabe, Boots, and Sugihara (1992).
4Note that this strategy is not uniquely defined at points t that have equal distance to
two or more translated interpretations. As these points form a null set for most norms,
e.g. the Euclidean norm or Lp−norms, we can ignore this ambiguity. Without loss of
generality, we always take the word with the smallest index in this case.
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Theorem 1 A profile of strategies (w, i) is a strict Nash equilibrium if and
only if (w, i) is an m–distorted Voronoi language with full vocabulary.
The complete proof is in the appendix.
The above result can be viewed from different angles. On the one hand,
it is a robustness check for the main theorem in Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel
(2011). The structure of strict Nash equilibria remains essentially the same
even when we introduce small conflicts of interests. This is also important
from another point of view. Real players may well have slightly wrong per-
ceptions, or make mistakes, or interpret signals in a slightly biased way. Nev-
ertheless, at least for small biases m, the strict Nash equilibria look similar
to the case of aligned interests.
However, when the bias becomes larger, one might doubt that the players
can still partially cooperate in this information transmission game. We give
now an example that shows that in general, distorted Voronoi languages
with full vocabulary need not exist. Our theorem then implies that the
game cannot have strict Nash equilibria. As was to be expected, perfect
communication breaks down when the interests are too far apart.
Example 1 Consider the unit interval T = [0, 1] with the uniform distribu-
tion F (x) = x, quadratic loss l(d) := d2 and two words W = {w1, w2}. We
can interpret this two words to have the usual meaning of ”left” and ”right”.
Let us choose a bias of |m| < 1
4
. Then the sender uses w∗(t) = w1 for
t ≤ 1
2
− 2m and w∗(t) = w2 else in the m–distorted Voronoi language. The
best interpretations for the receiver are i∗1 =
1
4
−m and i∗2 = 34 −m. We see
that rangew = W , hence the language uses full vocabulary. It is also unique
up to the obvious symmetry. For a positive bias, ”right” is used for a larger
set of types than ”left” (see Figure 1).
i1 i2
C1
3/10
C2
m
Figure 1: 1
10
–distorted Voronoi language on the unit interval.
Now let us show that for a bias |m| ≥ 1
4
, no m–distorted Voronoi language
with full vocabulary exists. Therefore, suppose to the contrary that (w, i) is
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such a language, without loss of generality i1 < i2. A type t ∈ T lies in C1 if
and only if
|t+m− i1| ≤ |t+m− i2| ⇔ t ≤ i1 + i2
2
−m.
It follows that i1 = b(C1) =
1
4
−m and i2 = b(C2) = 34 −m. Hence,
C1 =
[
0,
1
2
− 2m
]
and C2 =
(
1
2
− 2m, 1
]
.
Thus, we do not have rangew = W since |m| ≥ 1
4
, which is a contradic-
tion.
The example suggests that for small biases, we still get strict Nash equi-
libria. This holds true in general. As long as the bias m is sufficiently small,
distorted Voronoi languages with full vocabulary exist, and hence strict Nash
equilibria as well. This completes our robustness check of Ja¨ger, Metzger,
and Riedel (2011).
Proposition 1 There exists  > 0 such that for all m ∈ RL with ‖m‖ < 
m–distorted Voronoi languages with full vocabulary exist.
The complete proof is also in the appendix.
To provide some more intuition, we want to give examples with a two-
dimensional type space. First we consider uniformly distributed types and
two words. The resulting distorted Voronoi language is of a similar structure
compared to the one-dimensional example we studied before. We also see
that the condition for existence of distorted Voronoi languages derived above
is only sufficient, but not necessary. In general it can happen that even for an
arbitrary large bias, measured in terms of its norm, some resulting distorted
Voronoi language has full vocabulary.
Example 2 Consider the unit square T = [0, 1]2 with the uniform distribu-
tion F (x) = x, quadratic loss l(d) := d2 together with the Euclidean norm
‖·‖ and two words W = {w1, w2}. If we choose a bias m ∈ R2 such that
|m1| < 14 , then there is an m–distorted Voronoi language where the sender
uses w∗(t) = w1 for
{
t ∈ T |t1 ≤ 12 − 2m1
}
and w∗(t) = w2 else, i.e. the
square is divided vertically. The best interpretations for the receiver are
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i∗1 =
(
1
4
−m1, 12
)
and i∗2 =
(
3
4
−m1, 12
)
(see Figure 2).5 Furthermore, this
language uses full vocabulary and is hence a strict Nash equilibrium. Since
we did not impose any restrictions on the second component of the bias, m2,
we see that indeed the condition derived above is not necessary for the exis-
tence of a strict Nash equilibrium in this setting.
i1 i2
C1 C2
1/2-2m1 3/41/2 3/4-m11/4-m1 1/4
Figure 2: m–distorted Voronoi language on the unit square with 1
4
> m1 > 0
and arbitrary m2.
Finally, we want to give an example with normally distributed types and
more than two words. Since the computational demand becomes already
ambitious with more than two words and the uniform distribution, we rely on
simulations for this example. It turns out that as in the previous examples,
the interpretations are shifted into the direction which is opposite to the
direction of the bias.
Example 3 Consider the unit square T = [0, 1]2 with the normal distri-
bution, where we choose the variance small such that the borders receive a
5Analogue for |m2| < 14 and the language that divides the square horizontally. Similar
conditions hold for the languages that divide the square diagonally.
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mass close to zero. We adapt the algorithm presented in Ja¨ger, Metzger, and
Riedel (2011) to compute a distorted Voronoi language with more than two
words. But first we start with a Voronoi language or, in our terminology, a
0–distorted Voronoi language, which is meant to serve as a measure for the
impact the bias has on the tesselation. Note that the algorithm approximates
those languages which are stable, i.e. it chooses one of them (cf. Ja¨ger, Met-
zger, and Riedel (2011)). Then we introduce a bias m with equal and strictly
positive components that are small enough such that the resulting distorted
Voronoi language has full vocabulary. Thus, the algorithm approximates a
stable strict Nash equilibrium (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: A Voronoi language (left) and an m–distorted Voronoi language,
m1 = m2 > 0, with normally distributed types.
4 Conclusion
We study a signaling game with infinitely many types, only few signals and
conflict of interest. The point of departure is the model of Ja¨ger, Metzger,
and Riedel (2011), we introduce a bias to their model and show that strict
Nash equilibria are characterized by distorted Voronoi languages that use
all messages. In these signaling systems the sender uses a distorted Voronoi
tesselation where the prototypes that generate the tesselation are the best
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estimates in the Bayesian sense. This shows that the structure of strict Nash
equilibria basically stays the same when we introduce a bias, the tesselation
is a Voronoi tesselation generated by the prototypes translated by the bias.
Thus, this result provides a robustess check for the results in Ja¨ger, Metzger,
and Riedel (2011). Furthermore, we show that strict Nash equilibria exist if
the bias is small enough. For a large bias it can happen that the sender does
not use all messages in equilibrium, that is perfect communication breaks
down.
A Appendix
A.1 Choice of the bias
We show that using only a bias on the sender’s side is without loss of gener-
ality. Therefore, consider the game with a bias mS ∈ RL on the sender’s and
mR ∈ RL on the receiver’s side, and such that they do not coincide. Note
that this also covers the case where there is only a receiver’s bias by setting
mS = 0 and mR 6= 0. The expected losses then are
LS(w, i) :=
∫
T
l
(∥∥t+mS − iw(t)∥∥)F (dt)
and
LR(w, i) :=
∫
T
l
(∥∥t+mR − iw(t)∥∥)F (dt).
Defining T˜ := T +mR = {t+mR|t ∈ T}, we get
LR(w, i) =
∫
T˜
l
(∥∥t− iw(t)∥∥)F (dt)
and
LS(w, i) =
∫
T˜
l
(∥∥t−mR +mS − iw(t)∥∥)F (dt)
=
∫
T˜
l
(∥∥t+ m˜− iw(t)∥∥)F (dt),
where m˜ := mS − mR ∈ RL\{0}. Thus, we have reduced the game to the
situation with only a sender’s bias m˜ 6= 0.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Let (w, i) be an m–distorted Voronoi language with full vocabulary. The
sender chooses the word that minimizes her loss, that means this is a best
reply which is also F − a.s. unique since the interpretations are pairwise
distinct. The receiver uses the Bayesian estimators of the partition given
by the sender. This is a best reply since it minimizes her expected loss.
Furthermore, it is unique because the sender uses all words and additionally
the estimators are unique. Thus, (w, i) is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Contrary, suppose that (w, i) is a strict Nash equilibrium. The interpre-
tations of the receiver are the unique best reply to the strategy of the sender,
therefore the sender uses all words, because otherwise the receiver would be
indifferent between interpretations for words that are not used. Since w is a
best reply to the receiver’s interpretations, the sender chooses the word that
minimizes her loss given the interpretations of the receiver, i.e. without loss
of generality
w−1(wk) =
{
t ∈ T ∣∣k is the smallest number in argminj=1,...,N ‖t+m− ij‖} .
Her reply being also F − a.s. unique implies that the interpretations of the
receiver are pairwise distinct, because otherwise the sender would be indiffer-
ent between the respective words if her type was close to two interpretations
that are not distinct. Thus, she is using an m–distorted Voronoi tessela-
tion. Moreover, all cells of the tesselation have positive mass with respect
to F since she uses all words. For each cell of the tesselation the receiver
chooses the interpretation that minimizes her expected loss given she knows
the sender’s type to be in this cell, i.e. she uses the Bayesian estimator in-
terpretation for each cell, which is unique. Hence, (w, i) is an m–distorted
Voronoi language with full vocabulary.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
First note that a 0–distorted Voronoi language is a Voronoi language in the
terminology of Ja¨ger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011). They showed that Voronoi
languages with full vocabulary do always exist, and hence we have the exis-
tence of a 0–distorted Voronoi language with full vocabulary. Now we want
to show that the mapping
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f : RL × TN → R, (m, i) 7→
∫
T
N∑
k=1
l (‖t− ik‖) 1Cik(m)(t)F (dt)
is continuous.6 It is enough to show that the integrand is F − a.s. con-
tinuous.
Let
(
mn, (i
n
j )j=1,...,N
)
n∈N be a sequence in R
L×TN such that (mn, in) −→
n→∞
(m, i). Consider a type t in the interior of some Cih(m). Since t is in the
interior, for n large enough t ∈ Cinh (mn), i.e. 1Cih(m)(t) = 1Cinh (mn)(t) = 1. By
continuity of l(·), we get
N∑
k=1
l (‖t− ik‖) 1Cik(m)(t) = l (‖t− ih‖) 1Cih(m)(t) = limn→∞ l (‖t− i
n
h‖) 1Cih(m)(t).
Therefore, f = f(m, i) is continuous. Since TN is compact we can apply the
so called Maximum Theorem7, which still holds if we replace the Maximum
by the Minimum. Thus, also
g : RL → R,m 7→ min
i∈TN
∫
T
N∑
k=1
l (‖t− ik‖) 1Cik(m)(t)F (dt)
is continuous. Hence, considering a sequence (mn)n∈N in RL such that
mn → 0 as n→∞, we get
lim
n→∞
min
i∈TN
∫
T
N∑
k=1
l (‖t− ik‖) 1Cik(mn)(t)F (dt)
= min
i∈TN
∫
T
N∑
k=1
l (‖t− ik‖) 1Cik(0)(t)F (dt).
6The restriction of the interpretations to the type space T comes without loss of gen-
erality, the interpretations that minimize the integral are Bayesian estimators and hence
lie in T .
7see Ok (2007)
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Note that the latter is the loss of a 0–distorted Voronoi language, which
always have full vocabulary. This implies8 that there exists n¯ ∈ N such that
for all n ≥ n¯,
Ci
mn
k (mn) have positive mass with respect to F for all k = 1, . . . , N,
where imn ∈ argmini∈TN
∫
T
N∑
k=1
l (‖t− ik‖) 1Cik(mn)(t)F (dt).
Hence, if n ≥ n¯, then rangewmn = W and imnk are the Bayesian estimators
of the cells Ci
mn
k (mn). This implies that there exists  > 0 such that for all
m ∈ RL with ‖m‖ <  (wm, im) is an m–distorted Voronoi language with full
vocabulary.
8Suppose not, then there exists a sequence of languages ((wmn , imn))n∈N and a subse-
quence ((wmn′ , imn′ ))n′ such that (w
mn′ , imn′ ) does not use full vocabulary for all n′ and
by continuity
lim
n′→∞
LR(w
mn′ , imn′ ) = LR(w
0, i0).
(
contradiction since
(
w0, i0
)
has full vocabulary
)
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